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1. Introduction 
Loan securitization (securitization hereafter) is arguably one of the main triggers of the 
2007-09 global financial crisis. A commonly held view argues that securitization leads to a 
lower credit standard and less incentive for banks to monitor loans (Keys et al., 2010). 
Securitizers may also have incentives to securitize better-quality loans in the portfolio to pursue 
higher reputations or ratings and receive reductions in regulatory capital retention (Acharya, 
Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013), thus increasing bank risk on the balance sheet. However, the 
impact of securitization on bank risk is still inconclusive in the literature. Early studies suggest 
that securitization allows originators to transfer potential risk to security investors, along with 
the underlying assets (Pennacchi, 1988), and achieve increased portfolio and geographic 
diversification (Hughes et al., 1999; Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao, 2007; Berger and DeYoung, 
2001). Despite the strong prior, there is limited studies, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
that directly studies the impact of bank securitization and risk. In this paper we fill this gap and 
reconcile previous conflicting theories on the impact of bank securitization on risk. We find 
that the involvement of securitization leads to reduced bank risk in the short-term, while 
increase the likelihood of bank failure in the long run.  
Specifically, using data from commercial banks in the U.S. during the period of 2002 
to 2012, we document that the involvement of securitizations by commercial banks (measured 
as the ratio of securitized assets over total assets) is positively associated with Z-score. We 
report an average of 10.99% of a standard deviation increase of Z-score due to a one-standard-
deviation increase of total securitization ratio. In the second analysis, we employ a survival 
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analysis to estimate the long-term impact of securitization on bank risk. We find that the 
involvement of securitizations by commercial banks is positively associated with the likelihood 
of bank failure. We find 1% increase of total securitization ratio increases the possibility of 
bank failure by an average of 0.57%. Overall, these results suggest that securitization reduces 
bank risk in the short run but increases bank risk (likelihood of failure) over the long term.  
The explanations are as follows. Securitization creates a more efficient risk sharing 
through diversification. The pooling and traching of securitization create low-risk and highly 
liquid securities to attract investors (DeMarzo, 2005). Securitizers thus may easily shift their 
credit-risk exposures to the counter parties through true sales (Humphreys and Kreistman 1995; 
Kramer 2003). In practice, some risk can also be transferred out of the banking system through 
securitization, for example to hedge funds and equity investors, creating an even larger amount 
of investors to share the potential risk. Thus, securitization could reduce bank risk by 
substituting large potential exposures to direct borrowers with smaller and more diversified 
exposures and smoothing out the risks among many investors (Duffie, 2007).  
In the long run, however, securitizers may decrease their efforts on screening borrowers, 
lower borrowing standards, and grant more poor quality loans considering the potential risk 
can be easily transferred to the investors (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). The reckless behaviour 
links securitizers with aggressive risk taking and greater retentions of risky assets (Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007). The increased risk on the balance sheet may also increase their cost of 
financing. In response, securitizers may choose to securitize better assets rather than risky 
assets (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013), and left with insufficient capital buffer to survive 
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a severe event (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). The development of complex structured credit 
products makes it more difficult for most investors and rating agencies to analyse the potential 
risks and fair values of securitized assets (Griffin and Tang, 2009). Thus, the potential risk 
increase is not likely to be recognized within a short period. When the diversification 
mechanism of securitization is not able to cover the losses, a majority of bank failure could 
breakout (Wagner, 2010). 
We concern of the relationship identified by the baseline framework could be 
endogenous. On the one hand, small banks may not prefer securitizing loans due to substantial 
large amount of upfront fixed costs. On the other hand, banks with higher reputation are more 
likely to be frequent securitizers because of a lower lemon discounts (Campbell and Kracaw, 
1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). We conduct three methods to address this 
issue. First, we use the Heckman self-selection model to estimate the causal effect of 
securitization on Z-scores, where we adopt three exogenous instruments. The first instrument 
is the state-level corporate tax rate. On the one hand, the corporate-tax-exempt benefit of 
securitization may increase banks’ incentive to securitize assets (Han, Park, and Pennacchi, 
2015), and on the other hand, state-level corporate tax itself is not directly related to bank risk. 
Second, we construct a peer liquidity index based on Loutskina’s (2011) liquidity index, which 
captures banks’ incentive to securitize. It is also unlikely that a bank’s industry peers’ 
securitizing behavior can directly affect its own risk (other than through the channel of 
securitization). The third instrument is the interaction of the two above mentioned instruments; 
it captures both instruments’ characteristics. Second, we use instrumental variable method with 
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the same set of instruments and control variables.  
We finally use a propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares estimation 
method, where the weights are inversely proportional to the probability of a bank being a 
securitizer. We assign propensity scores (represented by ?̂?𝑝) estimated by a probit regression 
using the following control variables: bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-
interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local market power index, bank holding 
company (BHC) dummy, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dummy. A securitizer receives 
a weight of 1/ ?̂?𝑝, while a non-securitizer receives a weight of 1/(1- ?̂?𝑝). We also use a matched 
subsample including unique pairs of securitizer and non-securitizer with a difference of 
propensity score within 1%. All the results are consistent with the main results. 
The breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis suddenly dried out the liquidity in the 
market. Securitization activities significantly rely on the liquidity in the market, so the 
withdrawal of repurchase agreements may trigger a securitized-banking run (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2012). Thus, we expect the impact of securitization to decrease because of a 
significant shrink in the scale of securitization market. We divide the sample period into pre- 
and post-crisis subsamples in all estimations above. We define pre-crisis period to cover years 
from 2002 to 2007, while post-crisis period from 2007 to 2012. We find the impacts of 
securitization on bank’s Z-scores and the likelihood of bank failure are positive and statistically 
significant in both periods, but the economic significance decreases after the breakout of the 
financial crisis. Overall, the sub-sample results still support our main results. 
Main transmission mechanisms from securitization to bank riskiness are through capital 
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relief, favourable liquidity and risk transfer. To shed some more light on risk transfer, this paper 
focuses on mortgage securitization vs non-mortgage securitization. The collaterals (i.e., real 
estates) of mortgage loan are not easily depreciated (Campbell and Cocco, 2015). Mortgage 
loans are widely considered to be safer than non-mortgage loans. Mortgage securitization is in 
turn not significantly related to risk transferring (Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007). 
Securitizing risky assets (e.g., non-mortgage loans), however, is found to be a more efficient 
risk transferring to decrease expected losses (Minton et al., 2004; Bannier and Hansel, 2008). 
We thus expect the non-mortgage securitization ratios to be more significantly related to the 
increase of bank’s Z-scores. Mortgage loans are also easier to be securitized thanks to the higher 
quality and stronger degree of commoditisation (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez, 
2009). Mortgage securitizers are expected to more aggressive to take on more risk and lower 
their lending standards considering their potential risk can be easily shifted to the third parties. 
Thus, mortgage securitization is criticized more severely for deteriorating loan qualities and 
leading to potential problems (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). We expect mortgage 
securitization to be more strongly related to the likelihood of bank failure than non-mortgage 
securitization. To test the hypothesis, we break down securitization into mortgage and non-
mortgage groups. We find that while the increase of non-mortgage securitization ratios respond 
to higher Z-scores, mortgage securitization ratios are not significantly related to changes in Z-
scores. In the long run, mortgage securitization ratios are found to be more significantly related 
to the likelihood of bank failure.  
In practice, banks may choose loan sales rather than securitization because of a lower 
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level of fixed upfront costs (Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995). Our final test focuses on loan sales. 
Loan sales involve the totality of an originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are 
affected without recourse (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). Loan sellers can also reduce their 
risk by separating the ownership of riskier assets from their balance sheet (Berger and Udell, 
1993). We thus expect loan sale ratios are positively related to bank’s Z-scores. Similar to 
securitization, loan sales without recourse also increase sellers’ incentives to apply weaker 
managerial standards (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). We expect loan sale ratios are 
significantly related to the likelihood of bank failure. Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), 
we define loan sales by the difference between 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets 
owned by others, with servicing retained by the bank, and 2) the outstanding principal balance 
of assets sold and securitized by the bank. Using similar estimating methods, we find loan sales 
also reduce bank risk in the short run, but increase the likelihood of bank failure in the long 
run. 
Our paper provides direct empirical evidence on the impact of securitization on bank 
risk. Previous studies on securitization and bank risk pay more attentions on the theoretical 
basis, providing both risk reduction (Benveniste and Berger, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988) and risk 
increase theories (Kobayashi and Osano, 2012; van Oordt, 2014). Empirical examinations of 
securitization provide evidence with the impact on bank performance (Guner, 2006; Casu et 
al., 2012), or specific on the impact of CMBS (Titman and Tsyplakov, 2010; An, Deng, and 
Gabriel, 2011), CLOs (Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012), subprime mortgage loans 
(Keys, Seru, and Vig, 2012), and asset-backed commercial papers (Acharya, Schnabl, and 
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Suarez, 2013) on bank performance and managerial efforts. To authors’ best knowledge, there 
is no direct empirical evidence to test the impact of the involvement of securitization on bank 
risk. We thus reconcile the conflicts of theories and find a short-term risk reduction and long-
term bank failure increase effect of securitization. Part of our bank failure increase arguments 
is related to the rapid development of complex structured credit products. Higher complexity 
of securitization makes investors and rating agencies more difficult to analyse the potential 
risks and fair values (Griffin and Tang, 2009). Securitizers can in turn take advantage of the 
private information to take on more risk and decrease their monitoring efforts. Recent literature 
show higher complexity in securitization transactions can significantly decrease loan 
performance (Furfine, 2015) and increase default rates (Ghent, Torous, and Valkanov, 2014). 
Our study adds more evidence to this group of studies by providing a positive association 
between a higher complexity of securitization and the likelihood of failure. 
Our research also extends the understanding of the impact of securitization on bank                                                           
behaviour. Previous literature finds that securitization leads to a decreased cost of capital 
(Berger, Herring, and Szego, 1995; Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; 
Nicolo and Pelizzon, 2008; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012), a higher level of diversification 
(Allen and Carletti, 2006; Rossi, Schwaiger, and Winkler, 2009), and a higher level of liquidity 
(Loutskina, 2011; Casu et al., 2013). Thus, securitization is beneficial to securitizers because it 
relieves underinvestment problems (Lockwood, Rutherford, and Herrera, 1996) and increases 
profitability (Schliephake and Kirstein, 2013). However, securitization may also encourage 
banks to take advantage of the asymmetric information and decrease managerial efforts 
9 
 
(Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Ahn and Breton, 2014; Wang and 
Xia, 2014). Thus, securitization can also undermine the loan quality in the market (Jones, 2000; 
Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Purnanandam, 2011; Rosch and Scheule, 2012; 
Carbo-Valverde, Marques-Ibanez, Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2012). Our research provides a link 
between the disparate behaviours. 
Finally, our results in this paper may shed some light on the ongoing discussion of the 
role of securitization in changing the banking models and contributing to the 2007-09 global 
financial crisis. The implication of the results on the different impact of securitization on bank 
risk in the short and long term may suggest that the examination of bank risk should not only 
be focused on balance sheet ratios but also on the managerial system.  
In Section 2 we describe our dataset and empirical strategy. Section 3 shows the main 
results. Section 4 presents additional analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data 
We collect securitization and bank-specific data from the Reports of Income and 
Condition for commercial banks (the Call Report). Because U.S. banks are only required to 
provide detailed information on their securitization activities from June 2001, our annual data 
covers the period from 2002 to 2012. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel including 342 
banks with securitized loans and 8,483 banks without, accounting for 77,598 total bank-year 
observations. 
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2.2. Variables 
The key independent variable is the securitization ratio, which is defined as the ratio of 
the outstanding principal balance of assets securitized over total assets for a given type (i.e., 
mortgage or non-mortgage loans). 
We measure bank insolvency risk using the Z-score, which is equal to the return on 
assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns0F1: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅+𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅�
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
                                                            (1) 
A higher Z-score indicates a lower probability of insolvency risk. Because the Z-score 
is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score. For brevity, we use the label ‘‘Z-
score’’ in referring to the natural logarithm of the Z-score in the remainder of the paper. 
Following Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2013), we also compute Z-score scaled by the 
standard deviation of return on assets over a five-year rolling window.1F2  
We also define bank failure dummy as one if a bank failed or is acquired by another 
bank under government assistance, and zero otherwise. 
We control for a set of bank-specific variable in the regression analysis. Retained 
interest ratio is defined as the total amount of retained interest divided by the total amount of 
securitization assets of a given type, including the aggregate retained interests into credit 
enhancements, liquidity provisions, and seller’s interest. The incentive of securitizers to 
carefully monitor loans could increase by providing enhancements which may decrease bank 
 
1 Z-score is extensively used in bank risk literature, e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2008; Houston 
et al., 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Santos and Winton, 2008. 
2 Our results are robust with different rolling windows, from four to six years, when calculating the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
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risk (Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace, 2009). 
Bank size is defined as the natural logarithm of an individual bank’s total assets. The 
impact on risk and failure are not conclusive.2F3 We use diversification ratio to control for a 
bank’s diversification situation, which is defined as non-interest income divided by total 
operating income. Previous research suggests that diversification into non-interest income can 
reduce bank risk, as it improves banks’ ability to absorb volatilities in the interest income 
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). Liquidity ratio is calculated as liquid assets divided by total 
assets. Liquidity improves a bank’s lending ability, but high liquidity can also be associated 
with agency problems. Non-interest expense ratio is an indicator of banks’ efficiency, defined 
as non-interest expenses divided by total assets. Non-interest expenses are usually not 
associated with targeting customers to deposit funds; therefore, they are more likely to increase 
risk level and likelihood of failure (Lepetit et al., 2008). Non-performing loans ratio, computed 
as the amount of loans past due 90 days divided by total assets, reflects the risk management 
situation. Because non-performing loans are either in default or close to being in default, bank 
risk level and failure possibility can be positively related to the proportion of non-performing 
loans. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), we control for banks’ local market power as 
the deposit concentration for the local markets in which the bank operates. The larger the local 
 
3 For example, Hakenes and Schnabel (2011), Haan and Poghosyan (2012), and DeMiguel et al. (2013) suggest a 
negative relationship between bank size and bank risk, while Gennotte and Pyle (1991) support a positive 
relationship. The literature also offers arguments suggesting that bank size may increase (Uhde and Michalak, 
2010) and decrease (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) the likelihood of bank failure. 
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market power, the greater a bank’s market power and concentration in its surroundings. We use 
a bank holding company (BHC) dummy to control for whether it belongs to a bank holding 
company. BHC dummy equals one if the bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero 
otherwise. A bank belonging to a bank holding company is expected to be more likely to survive, 
because the holding company is required to act as a source of strength to all the banks it owns 
(Houston and James, 1998; Paligorova and Xu, 2012). However, within a short time window, 
banks belonging to a BHC are more likely to take more risk, as they have this “backup” (Jiang, 
Lee, and Yue, 2010). We finally use a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dummy, which equals 
one if the bank is located in a metropolitan area, and zero otherwise, to identify individual 
banks’ locations. Competition may be fiercer in metropolitan areas, and banks in suburban 
areas are more likely to have a more stable environment. 
 
2.3 Empirical strategy 
In order to test whether bank loan securitization impacts differently on short- and long-
term risk, we start to estimate the relationship between loan securitization and bank Z-score. 
We first use the following OLS model: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡         (2) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is the vector of 
total securitization ratio, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  is the vector of bank-specific control variables, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  is the 
individual difference, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 is the time variation that not related to individual charateristics, and 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the disturbance term.  
The relationship identified by the OLS model could be biased since self-selection 
13 
 
problem exists in the decision of securitizing loans. First, securitization involves substantial 
upfront fixed costs including consultancy and organizational costs, payments to rating agencies, 
underwriting fees, and legal expenses. Small banks thus may not prefer securitizing loans. 
Second, the lemon discount required on the underlying assets suggests that securitized assets 
are likely to be underpriced (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). Thus, banks with higher reputation are more likely to enjoy a lower discount during 
securitization process. The existence of self-selection problem in securitization is, therefore, a 
rational conjecture.  
We use three methods to address this endogeneity issue. First, we use a Heckman self-
selection model, where we introduce three instrument variables. The first instrument is the 
state-level corporate tax rate3F 4 , because higher corporate tax rates may increase a bank’s 
incentive to securitize assets due to the corporate tax exemption of securitized assets (Han, 
Park, and Pennacchi, 2015). The second instrument is peer liquidity index. Liquidity index is 
proposed by Loutskina (2011) to effectively capture banks’ ability to sell loans. Following 
Loutskina (2011), we break down a bank’s loan portfolio into six groups: 1) home mortgages, 
2) multi-family residential mortgages, 3) commercial mortgages, 4) agricultural loans, 5) 
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, and 6) consumer credit.4F5 Liquidity index is defined as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ∑ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � × (𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)6𝑗𝑗=1           (3) 
In this equation, 𝐸𝐸𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍 𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the total securitized loans of 
 
4 The data are available from the U.S. Tax Foundation website at: http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html. 
5 The data used to construct liquidity index comes from the “Financial Accounts of the United States” (Z.1) data 
release. 
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type j at time t in the whole economy, 𝐸𝐸𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍 𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is the total loans 
outstanding of type j at time t in the whole economy, and 𝐿𝐿𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the share of type j 
loans in bank i at time t in the whole economy.  
 Finally, we construct bank i’s peer liquidity index by calculating the average liquidity 
index of bank i’s peers.5F6 The herd effect (Chari and Kehoe, 2004) implies that an individual 
bank’s incentive to securitize loans can be stimulated by its industry peers, but it is unlikely 
that a bank’s industry peers’ securitizing behaviour can directly affect this bank’s risk.  
State-level corporate tax rate only provides information on the impact of securitization 
incentives of a state’s “average” bank, while peer liquidity index captures no state-level 
difference. We construct the third instrument by interacting the above two instruments. After 
using the instruments to determine the incentives to securitize loans in the first-step regression, 
we add the self-selection control variable, inverse Mills ratio, into the following main 
regression: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍 𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                   (4) 
Second, we use instrumental variable approach, where we employ the same set of 
instruments and control variables as the Heckman model.  
Finally, we concern the potential biases caused by the unbalanced samples with the 
sample of securitizer (342) being significantly smaller than that of non-securitizers (8,483). 
Following Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015), we use the propensity score matching 
 
6 Bank i itself is excluded.  
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based weighted square regression. We first assign propensity scores (represented by ?̂?𝑝) to banks 
using the following bank-specific characteristics: bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, 
non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local market power index, bank holding 
company (BHC) dummy, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dummy. A securitizer receives 
a weight of 1/ ?̂?𝑝 , while a non-securitizer receives a weight of 1/(1- ?̂?𝑝 ). We then refine our 
sample by constructing a subsample consists of securitizers and their most similar non-
securitizer counterparties. We use a 1:1 matching by imposing a 1% tolerance on the difference 
of propensity scores of each securitizer and matched non-securitizer. We also divide the sample 
period into pre- and post-crisis to check the difference. Our results are also robust when we use 
simple propensity score matching method.  
We use the survival analysis to estimate the relationship between securitization ratio 
and the likelihood of bank failure. Survival analysis is concerned with studying the time 
between a treatment’s initial application and a subsequent event (such as bank failure), so it is 
possible to test the long-term impact of securitization. The survival analysis technique has been 
widely applied in banking research. Cole and Gunther (1995) employ survival analysis to study 
the determinants of bank failure. Recently, Berger and Bouwman (2013) used survival analysis 
to estimate the relationship between a bank’s capital and its likelihood of survival. The Cox 
proportional hazards model is specified as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑙𝑙 �
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
𝜆𝜆0(𝑡𝑡) � = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     (5) 
where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆) is the hazard function for securitizers under the event of 
bank failure, 𝜆𝜆0(𝑆𝑆) is the average survival time of the entire sample, 𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
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is the vector of total securitization ratio, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the vector of bank-specific control variables, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 
is the individual differences that not related to time variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the disturbance term. 
We also use the logit model to check the robustness of the results of survival analysis.   
The breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis significantly changes the macroeconomic 
environment, e.g., it suddenly dried out the liquidity in the market. Securitization activities rely 
heavily on the liquidity in the market, so the withdrawal of repurchase agreements may trigger 
a securitized-banking run (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The significant dive of the securitization 
market scale may in turn decrease the impact of securitization. Thus, we expect the impact of 
securitization on bank’s risk may be decreased after the breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
We divide our sample into pre- and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis period covers years from 2002 
to 2006, while post-crisis period covers years from 2007 to 2012. We then rerun all regressions 
using the before and after 2007 subsamples. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Preliminary analysis 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics on all variables used in this study for both 
securitizers and non-securitizers. We report the number and proportion of failed banks on 
securitizers and non-securitizers in Panel A, Table 1. Within each group, we also divide the 
sample into pre- and post-crisis periods. We show that 331 banks securitized their assets and 3 
(0.91%) of them went failure before the breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis. After the 
breakout of the crisis, there were 17 (5.74%) securitizers failed. A similar picture can be seen 
for non-securitizers. Before 2007, we find 70 (0.87%) of 8,059 non-securitizers failed while 
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this proportion surges to 7.08% (505 failed banks out of a sample of 7,137 non-securitizers) 
after 2007.  
<Insert Table 1 Panel A Here> 
Panel B, Table A shows the descriptive statistics of securitizers and non-securitizers on 
the rest of variables.6F7 We also divide the sample into pre- and post-crisis periods. Statistics of 
mean, median, and standard deviation (SD) are reported under each subgroup. The average 
value of Z-scores decreased from 1.05 before 2007 to 0.63 from 2007, and the standard 
deviations of Z-scores for both securitizers and non-securitizers also increased significantly 
after 2007. These results reflect the severe impact of crisis on bank risk. Since values of 
securitization related variables for non-securitizers are all zero, we only report the statistics for 
securitizers on variables of total securitization ratio% and total retained interest ratio%. We 
also show a significant dive of the securitization market scale after the breakout of crisis 
(average securitization of 13.24% before 2007 vs. 7.08% from 2007), which could be caused 
by a sudden erosion of liquidity in the capital market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The average 
credit enhancements level increases from 4.28% to 5.26%, suggesting investors become more 
cautious after realizing the crisis. Small banks are rare securitizers due to a large amount of 
upfront costs, and we show that the average size of securitizers (nearly $596 million) in our 
sample is over four times than non-securitizers (nearly $134 million). Literature show that 
securitization allows banks to achieve more diversified portfolios (DeMarzo, 2005), and a 
lower liquidity level (Lourtskina, 2011). The costs of deposits are lower for bank holding 
 
7 We report percentage values of ratio variables in Table 1. 
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companies that located in a metropolitan area with higher market power, so they are more likely 
to be able to maintain the “originate-to-distribute” funding model (Loutskina and Strahan, 
2009). Our results support all theories above. 
<Insert Table 1 Panel B Here> 
We also show the differences between securitizers and non-securitizers and changes for 
the before and after the 2007-09 financial crisis sub-periods in Panel C, Table 1, where we also 
report Student's t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the means and medians of the differences, 
respectively. The breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis witnessed a more significant increase 
in proportions of failed non-securitizers (6.21%) than securitizers (4.84%), and the proportion 
of failed non-securitizers exceeds that of securitizers (by 1.33%). The Student’s t-test shows 
that the difference between proportions of failed securitizers and non-securitizers is statistically 
significant at 1% level. This result links securitization with a higher likelihood of bank failure 
before 2007. This finding confirms that banks with high involvement in the OTD market during 
the pre-crisis period contribute more significantly to the loan quality deterioration 
(Purnanandam, 2011). The 2007-09 financial crisis also significantly decreases bank risk, 
where we find the average Z-scores of securitizers and non-securitizers decreases by 0.42 and 
0.43, respectively. However, Z-scores of securitizers are higher than non-securitizers in both 
periods (i.e., before and after 2007), suggesting securitization could decrease bank risk. We 
also find significant differences between securitizers and non-securitizers regarding to the rest 
of control variables, which are all in the line with our previous findings. 
<Insert Table 1 Panel C Here> 
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3.2. The impact of bank securitization on Z-score 
Results on our baseline model of the impact of loan securitization on bank’s Z-scores 
are reported in Table 2. We report results of OLS in column (1), Heckman model in columns 
(2) to (4), and instrumental variable approach in columns (5) to (7), respectively. We report the 
second-step results of Heckman self-selection and IV models using instruments of: i) state-
level corporate tax rate; ii) peer liquidity index, and iii) state-level corporate tax rate × peer 
liquidity index, from columns (2) to (7). The first-step results are all reported in Appendix C. 
All regressions include bank and year fixed effects.  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
Across all specifications, the key variable, total securitization ratio, has positive and 
significant coefficients, indicating that the involvement of securitization activities is associated 
with a decrease in bank risk. In column (1), we show a one-standard-deviation increase in total 
securitization ratio is associated with an increase of 10.99% of a standard deviation in bank’s 
Z-scores. We find similar economic impacts using Heckman and instrumental variable 
estimations, where a one-standard-deviation increase in total securitization ratio is associated 
with an average increase of 6.49% (from column (2) to (4)) and 6.91%7F8 (from column (5) to 
(7)) of a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores, respectively. These results are in line with our 
 
8  The standardized economic significances estimated by Heckman models using instrument: i) state-level 
corporate tax rate, ii) peer liquidity index, and iii) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index, are 6.26% 
(column (2)), 6.11% (column (3)), and 7.09% (column (4)), respectively. Those significances estimated by 
instrumental variable models are 6.69% (column (5)), 8.24% (column (6)), and 5.80% (column (7)), respectively. 
We use the same averaging methods based on these three instruments to conduct the average economic 
significances for the rest of the paper, which we will not specify each number hereafter. 
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hypothesis that securitization could help banks to reduce their risk in the short run by 
substituting large potential exposures to direct borrowers with smaller and more diversified 
exposures and smoothing out the risks among many investors (Duffie, 2007).  
Results on the control variables are largely in the line with our expectations and 
previous literature. Literature suggests that providing credit enhancements could decrease bank 
risk by forcing securitizers to retain long-term economic exposure. Our findings support this 
argument by presenting a positive relationship between total retained interest ratio and Z-score.  
The negative correlation between bank size and Z-score can be explained by the too-big-to-fail 
theory that larger banks are more likely to take on more risk. As expected, a higher level of 
diversification and liquidity decreases bank risk, while less efficient banks are likely to be 
riskier. 
Analysis so far ignores the presence of the 2007-09 financial crisis, we therefore divide 
our sample into pre- and post-crisis periods to examine whether securitization activities impact 
differently on bank risk. We rerun the OLS, Heckman, and instrumental variable regressions 
using the subsamples and report the results in Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
Consistent with the results on full sample, we find the coefficients of total securitization 
ratio are all significant and positive in all specifications. We also find a decreased economic 
impact of securitization ratio on Z-score after the breakout of the financial crisis. For example, 
in column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in total securitization ratio is associated with 
an increase of 13.48% of a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores before 2007 when estimated 
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by OLS, while this economic impact significantly decreases to 8.06% (column (2)) after 2007. 
Similar declines of economic significance are also found in Heckman and instrumental variable 
estimations. After June 2007, the securitization market suffered significant dive in total scale 
since insufficient information to price and quality of securities (Pagano and Volpin, 2012), 
which increased the overhang of illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009). Bank risk in turn cannot be sufficiently transferred through securitization 
process. Another explanation could be the motivation change after 2007. Bedendo and Bruno 
(2012) argue that the principal incentive behind credit risk transferring activities is to raise 
financial resources rather than transferring risk during severe times.  
We also concern of the unbalanced observations for securitizers (3,132) and non-
securitizers (74,466), and employ a propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares 
estimation to address this problem using a full sample and 1:1 matched sample. Results on full 
sample, 1:1 matched sample are reported in column (1) to (2), Table 4. Results again show a 
positive and significant association between securitization ratio and bank’s Z-scores. After 
dividing our sample into pre- and post-crisis periods, we report consistent results in column (3) 
and (4). Taken together results in Table 2 to 4, our first analysis suggests the involvement of 
securitization decreases bank’s risk measured by Z-score. 
<Insert Table 4 > 
 
3.3. The impact of bank securitization on the likelihood of failure 
The results so far demonstrate that the involvement of securitization has a positive 
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impact on bank risk measured by Z-score. However, this relationship tends to be short term 
because Z-score is calculated by year-end balance sheet ratios and may only capture a snapshot 
of bank risk. The sub-sample analysis of the 2007-09 financial crisis on Z-score also presents 
the relationship is strongly related to short-term economic situations. Following Chava, Livdan, 
and Purnanandam (2009), we use the Cox proportional hazards model along with a logistic 
model to estimate the impact of securitization on the likelihood of bank failure. The Cox model 
is likely to capture long-term effect and statistically superior for bankruptcy prediction since it 
takes the time at risk into consideration (see Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004). Results 
on Cox models are reported in columns (1) to (3), Table 5, while results using logit models are 
reported in columns (4) to (6). We also divided the sample into pre- and post-2007 periods. We 
control for bank fixed effects in both regressions and report coefficients in the Cox models and 
marginal effects (rounded to four decimals) in logit regressions.  
<Insert Table 5 Here> 
 Total securitization ratio is found to have a positive and significant impact on the 
likelihood of bank failure, and the results are consistent among all regressions. We find a 1% 
increase of total securitization ratio leads to a 0.75% (exp(0.561) – 1) (column (1)) and 0.39% 
(column (4)) increase of possibility of bank failure, estimated by Cox and logit models, 
respectively. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the involvement of 
securitization could lead to long-term risk. Securitization encourages banks to take on more 
risk, decrease their efforts on screening borrowers, lower borrowing standards, and grant more 
poor quality loans (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). The possibility of bank failure in turn 
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increases because the diversification mechanism of securitization may not enough to cover the 
potential losses in the long run (Wagner, 2010).  
After dividing the sample into pre- and post-2007 periods, we find securitization ratio 
is still positively related to the likelihood of bank failure for both sub-sample periods. We report 
an average 1.21% (column (2) and (5)) increase of possibility of bank failure caused by 1% 
increase in population means of total securitization ratio before 2007, while this marginal effect 
decreases to an average of 0.28% (column (3) and (6)) after 2007. The decreased impact of 
securitization on the likelihood of bank failure may also due to the significant decrease in the 
scale of securitization market caused by the liquidity shortage in the secondary market after the 
breakout of financial crisis.  
Similar to the analysis on Z-scores, we also employ a propensity score matching based 
weighted-least-squares estimation for bank failure to address the endogeneity problem. 
Marginal effects of each variable on the likelihood of bank failure are reported in Table 6. We 
find consistent positive and significant impact of securitization ratios on the likelihood of bank 
failure, which confirms our main findings on bank failure in Table 5. Taken together the results 
on Z-scores and bank failure, we find evidence to support the hypothesis that securitization 
leads to a short-term risk reduction, and long-term failure increase effect. 
<Insert Table 6 > 
 
4. Additional analysis 
4.1. The impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on bank Z-score and the 
likelihood of bank failure 
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Main transmission mechanisms from securitization to bank riskiness are through capital 
relief, favourable liquidity and risk transfer. To shed some more light on risk transfer, this paper 
focuses on mortgage securitization vs non-mortgage securitization. Mortgage loans are widely 
considered to be higher quality due to the underlying real estates are not easily depreciated 
(Campbell and Cocco, 2015). Mortgage securitization is in turn not significantly related to risk 
transferring (Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007). Non-mortgage securitization, however, allows 
banks to remove riskier asset out of their balance sheet and share potential risk with a large 
number of investors, decreasing the expected losses (Minton et al., 2004; Bannier and Hansel, 
2008). We thus expect a more significant impact of non-mortgage securitization ratios on the 
increase of Z-scores. Meanwhile, mortgage loans can be easily securitized due to the higher 
quality and stronger degree of commoditisation (e.g., mortgage loans enjoy a higher 
standardisation of credit assessment techniques) (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez, 
2009). The rapid development of the secondary market makes it even more convenient to banks 
to securitize mortgage loans (Frame and White, 2005). Mortgage securitizers are in turn 
encouraged to take on more risk and reduce their incentives to carefully monitoring loans 
(Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Non-mortgage securitization requires securitizers to provide 
higher retention of risk exposures8F9 during the process in order to signal the quality of the 
underlying assets (Guo and Wu, 2014), which forces non-mortgage securitizers to keep 
monitoring loans (Kiff and Kisser, 2010) and be more cautious when granting loans (Hattori 
 
9 It is found in International Monetary Fund (2009) that a minimum retention requirement of 5% could be binding 
for almost all types of asset-backed securities (ABS), but this retention ratio for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
is below 1%.  
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and Ohashi, 2011). We thus expect the impact of mortgage securitization on the likelihood of 
bank failure is more significant than non-mortgage securitization. 
To test our hypothesis, we break down securitization activities into mortgage and non-
mortgage securitizations. Mortgage loans include 1-4 home mortgages, while non-mortgage 
loans contain all other types of loans, including home equity lines, credit card receivables, auto 
loans, commercial and industrial loans, other consumer loans, and all other loans. We replace 
total securitization ratios in all specifications with mortgage and non-mortgage securitization 
ratios, respectively. The OLS and Cox survival analysis results are reported in Table 7. We 
report the Heckman self-selection model results on Z-scores in Appendix D.  
<Insert Table 7 Here> 
We find mortgage securitization ratio is not significantly related to Z-score, while non-
mortgage securitization is found to have a significant and positive impact on Z-score. A one-
standard-deviation increase in non-mortgage securitization ratio is associated with an increase 
of 6.73% of a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores, and this economic impact is 11.93% and 
2.88% before and after 2007, respectively. This finding is in the line with the evidence of no 
risk transfer in mortgage securitization (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013). Regards to the 
likelihood of bank failure, we find mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations both lead to a 
higher likelihood of bank failure. The marginal impact of mortgage securitization is 
significantly higher than non-mortgage securitization. A 1% increase of securitized mortgage 
loans ratio leads to a 1.04% increase in the possibility of bank failure, compare with that of 
non-mortgage securitization ratio is 0.20%. Mortgage securitization is more likely to encourage 
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banks to take on more risk and lower the lending standards, which may contribute more 
significantly to the deteriorate of loan qualities in the market and the likelihood of bank failure.  
 
4.2. The impact of loan sales on bank Z-score and the likelihood of bank failure 
Our final test focuses on loan sales. Similar to securitizations, loan sales also allow 
sellers to transfer potential risk to the buyers. However, loan sales involve the totality of an 
originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are affected without recourse and bank serves 
as a pure broker (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). In practice, banks may choose to use total 
loan sale rather than securitization as their funding strategy (Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995). 
Loan sellers can also reduce potential risk by separating the ownership of riskier assets from 
their balance sheet (Berger and Udell, 1993), which in turn transfers the potential risk to the 
loan buyers. Meanwhile, loan sales without recourse increase sellers’ incentives to apply 
weaker managerial standards, leading to the deterioration of loan quality (Cebenoyan and 
Strahan, 2004). We thus expect a similar impact of loans sales on bank’s Z-scores and the 
likelihood of failure. Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), we define loan sales by the 
difference between 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets owned by others, with 
servicing retained by the bank, and 2) the outstanding principal balance of assets sold and 
securitized by the bank. Loan sales data are collected from the Call Report, and the regression 
results are reported in Table 8. 
<Insert Table 8 Here> 
We find a similar positive impact of loan sale on bank’s Z-score. The coefficients of 
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loan sale ratio are all positive and statistically significant at 1% level across all specifications. 
We find a one-standard-deviation increase in loan sale ratio is associated with an increase of 
7.51% and an average increase of 7.47% of a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores when 
estimated by OLS and Heckman models, respectively. This finding holds after we divide the 
sample into pre- and post-2007 periods, where the economic impact is around 8% before 2007, 
and 6% after 2007. Results on bank failure are also consistent with securitization regressions, 
where a 1% increase of loan sale ratios leads to a 2.6% increase in the possibility of bank failure. 
Thus, results show loan sale activities have a similar risk reduction effect during a short term, 
and a bank failure possibility increase effect in the long run.  
  
6. Conclusion 
We study how securitization affects bank risk on the short and long term. To address 
the endogeneity problem in securitization, we employ both a Heckman self-selection model 
and an instrumental variable approach. We also introduce three instruments, i) state-level 
corporate tax rate; ii) peer liquidity index; iii) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity 
index; in both analyses. We find consistent and robust results in all specifications. We document 
that the involvement of securitization decreases bank’s short-term risk measured by Z-score, 
but increases the likelihood of bank failure in the long run.   
Concerning the severe economic environmental change before and after the 2007-09 
financial crisis, we also divide the sample period into pre- and post-crisis periods. We find 
consistent results, but spot a significant economic significance change after the breakout of the 
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2007-09 crisis. Specifically, the risk reduction benefit of securitization is significantly 
decreased after 2007, while the marginal effects of securitization on the likelihood of bank 
failure are rather stable with a small increase.  
In addition, we find disparate impacts between mortgage and non-mortgage 
securitizations. Mortgage securitization is not likely to help banks to reduce their short-term 
risk, while non-mortgage securitization could provide efficient risk transferring. However, both 
mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations significantly increase bank’s possibility of failure, 
between which the economic impact of mortgage securitization is more significant. We also 
find that loan sale activities respond to a similar positive impact on bank risk. Overall, we 
present a short-term risk reduction and a long-term risk increase effect of securitization.  
Our research may shed some light on the debate on the impact of securitization on bank 
risk. While securitization may be a good risk management tool to help securitizers reduce 
temporary risk, it can also increase banks’ incentives to take excessive risk. This suggests that, 
rather than restricting banks’ securitization activities, regulators should focus more on 
investigating the changes in lending standards and other risk-taking behaviour as a result of 
securitization.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Statistics for bank failure               
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this paper. The statistics are based on our panel data including 342 securitizers and 8,483 non-
securitizers during the period of 2002 to 2012, accounting for total bank-year observations of 3,983. Previous periods are not included because U.S. banks are only required to provide detailed 
information on their securitization activities from June 2001. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Concerning the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we divide the time 
period into before- and after-2007 to check the difference. Panel A reports the statistics of bank failures in terms of number of failed banks (failed #) and the proportion of failed banks 
(failed %) in the total number of banks (bank #). Panel B reports the statistics of securitizers and non-securitizers, respectively. We show statistics of mean, median, and standard deviation. 
Panel C shows the comparative statistics of: 1.the difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods; and, 2.the difference between securitizers and non-securitizers. Differences in the number 
and proportion of failed banks are showed with regards to variable of bank failure, while differences in means and medians are showed for the rest of variables. Information on Student’s t-
test on means and Wilcoxon rank-sum test on medians are also showed in Panel C. 
 Securitizers  Non-securitizers 
  before 2007 after 2007  before 2007 after 2007 
 bank # failed # failed % Obs. bank # failed # failed % Obs.  bank # failed # failed % Obs. bank # failed # failed % Obs. 
Bank 
failure 331 3 0.91% 1,534 296 17 5.74% 1,598   8,059 70 0.87% 36,221 7,137 505 7.08% 38,245 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Statistics for securitizers and non-securitizers              
 Securitizers  Non-securitizers 
  before 2007 after 2007  before 2007 after 2007 
Dependent variable                                
 mean median SD Obs. mean median SD Obs.  mean median SD Obs. mean median SD Obs. 
Z-score 1.05 0.96 0.45 1,534 0.64 1.04 1.01 1,598  1.05 1.02 0.34 36,221 0.61 0.96 0.98 38,245 
Securitization regressor                   
Total securitization ratio% 13.24 4.00 56.54 1,534 7.08 1.46 30.78 1,598  - - - - - - - - 
Bank-specific control variables                  
Total retained interest ratio% 4.28 1.75 14.33 1,534 5.26 0.00 20.00 1,598  - - - - - - - - 
Bank size 13.23 12.68 2.01 1,534 13.36 12.97 1.86 1,598  11.65 11.54 1.19 36,221 11.94 11.84 1.19 38,245 
Diversification ratio% 25.55 14.24 25.56 1,534 24.44 14.04 25.28 1,598  12.55 10.56 10.10 36,221 11.97 9.99 10.78 38,245 
Bank liquidity ratio% 22.60 21.01 12.84 1,534 20.65 18.77 12.15 1,598  23.33 21.06 14.63 36,221 22.15 19.46 14.92 38,245 
Non-interest expense ratio% 3.38 2.86 1.96 1,534 3.34 2.93 1.69 1,598  3.07 2.88 1.20 36,221 3.13 2.93 1.23 38,245 
Non-performing loans ratio% 1.89 0.48 3.58 1,534 2.55 0.36 4.63 1,598  1.53 0.23 3.02 36,221 1.54 0.09 3.30 38,245 
Local-market power 2.29 0.02 5.42 1,534 2.47 0.03 5.82 1,598  0.46 0.01 2.40 36,221 0.51 0.01 2.50 38,245 
Bank holding company dummy 0.86 1.00 0.34 1,534 0.90 1.00 0.30 1,598  0.82 1.00 0.39 36,221 0.83 1.00 0.38 38,245 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy 0.79 1.00 0.41 1,534 0.78 1.00 0.41 1,598   0.61 1.00 0.49 36,221 0.61 1.00 0.49 38,245 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers          Difference with the reference of 2007/2008 financial crisis   Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers 
 difference = value after 2007 - value before 2007  difference = value of securitizer - value of non-securitizer 
  Securitizers Non-securitizers  Before 2007 After 2007 
Dependent variable               
statistic Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means  Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means 
Bank failure 4.84% a* 6.21% a  0.04% a -1.33% a 
statistic Dif mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Z-score -0.42 0.08 a -0.43 -0.05 a, b  0.01 -0.06 a, b 0.03 0.07 a 
Securitization regressor               
Total securitization ratio% -6.16 -2.54 a, b - - -  - - - - - - 
Bank-specific control variables              
Total retained interest ratio% 0.98 -1.75 b - - -  - - - - - - 
Bank size 0.14 0.29 a, b 0.29 0.29 a, b  1.58 1.14 a, b 1.42 1.13 a, b 
Diversification ratio% -1.10 -0.20 - -0.58 -0.57 a, b  13.00 3.68 a, b 12.47 4.05 a, b 
Bank liquidity ratio% -1.95 -2.25 a, b -1.18 -1.60 a, b  -0.73 -0.05 a -1.49 -0.69 a, b 
Non-interest expense ratio% -0.04 0.07 b 0.06 0.05 a, b  0.31 -0.01 a 0.21 0.01 a 
Non-performing loans ratio% 0.66 -0.12 a, b 0.01 -0.14 b  0.36 0.25 a, b 1.01 0.27 a, b 
Local-market power 0.19 0.01 b 0.04 0.00 a, b  1.82 0.02 a, b 1.97 0.03 a, b 
Bank holding company dummy 0.04 0.00 a 0.01 0.00 a  0.05 0.00 a 0.08 0.00 a 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummy -0.01 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 -   0.17 0.00 a 0.17 0.00 a 
NOTE: * Letters "a" and "b" indicate a significant difference of means and medians at 1% level, respectively.        
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Table 2: The impact of loan securitization on Z-score 
Table 2 shows our baseline results on the impact of total loan securitization ratio on bank's Z-scores. The sample period is 2002-2012. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank 
size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area 
dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The baseline OLS results are reported in column (1). Concerning the endogeneity problem, we use Heckman self-selection model 
and 2SLS as two identifications. We introduce three instruments in the Heckman and 2SLS models: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and 3) state-level corporate tax 
rate × peer liquidity index. We only report the second-step results in columns (2) to (7), respectively. The first-step results are reported in Appendix C. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Z-score 
 OLS  Heckman  2SLS 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Instrument (none)  (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) 
Total securitization ratiot-1 0.383***  0.218*** 0.213*** 0.247**  0.233*** 0.202*** 0.287***  (0.13)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.27) (0.10) 
Total retained interest ratiot-1 0.004  0.280*** 0.280*** 0.322*  1.674** 1.927*** 3.047***  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.14)  (0.71) (0.72) (4.08) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.079***  -0.055** -0.129*** -0.356***  -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.074***  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.26)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Diversification ratiot-1 0.145***  0.131 0.142*** 0.502***  0.090*** 0.096*** 0.142*** 
 (0.05)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.29)  (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 -0.472**  -14.734 -1.335** -0.351***  -0.344 -0.318 -0.212 
 (0.20)  (10.76) (1.25) (0.31)  (0.30) (0.31) (0.54) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.020  0.221 0.052 -4.421***  -1.273 -1.020** -1.513** 
 (0.08)  (0.31) (0.29) (2.52)  (0.86) (1.89) (0.97) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 -0.131***  -0.006 -0.026** -0.484***  -0.304 -0.367** -0.606** 
 (0.03)  (0.05) (0.07) (0.86)  (0.32) (0.34) (1.10) 
Local-market powert-1 0.027  0.484*** -0.446*** -0.226**  0.041 0.037 -0.126 
 (0.02)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.30) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.038***  -0.067* -0.075* -3.238***  -0.056*** -0.024 -0.050*** 
 (0.01)  (0.04) (0.04) (2.86)  (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.013  -0.099*** -0.091*** -16.79*  -0.017** -0.015* -0.007  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (8.69)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 1.311***  1.616*** 3.204*** 1.671***  1.074*** 1.284** 1.119***  (0.09)  (0.48) (0.80) (1.34)  (0.09) (0.63) (0.08) 
Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.235*** -0.243*** -0.488***     
     (0.07) (0.08) (0.13)        
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258  69,258 69,258 69,258  69,258 69,258 69,258 
Adjusted-R² 0.2534   0.4346 0.3446  0.3418    0.4579 0.4928  0.4579  
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Table 3: The impact of loan securitization on Z-score, before- and after-2007 
Table 3 shows our baseline results using split samples referring to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We divide our sample into before- and after-2007 periods. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity 
ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Results on before and after 
2007 subsamples using OLS estimators are reported in columns (1) and (2), respectively. We use Heckman self-selection model and 2SLS as two additional identifications to address the endogeneity problem. We introduce three instruments in 
the Heckman and 2SLS models: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. We report second-step results of Heckman model in columns (3) to (8), while results using 2SLS 
estimations in columns (9) to (14), respectively. The first-step results are reported in Appendix C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Z-score 
 OLS Heckman 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Instrument (none) (none) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Time period 
before 
2007 
after 
2007 before 2007 after 2007 before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratiot-
1 0.347** 0.442* 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.194*** 0.212*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.080** 0.078** 0.118** 0.265** 0.228** 0.285** 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) 
Total retained interest 
ratiot-1 0.034 0.000 0.269*** 0.275*** 0.264*** 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 4.137** 3.497 3.532** 0.465 -10.883 0.045** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.82) (11.56) (1.71) (0.32) (11.70) (0.35) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.007** -0.11*** -0.149*** -0.188*** -0.118*** -0.005 -0.045 -0.023 -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.059** -0.025*** -0.128*** -0.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.34) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
Diversification ratiot-1 0.066 0.110* 0.268** 0.254* 0.287** 0.011 0.026 -0.017 0.177** 0.164** -0.053 -0.022 0.428 -0.009 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.56) (0.03) (0.46) (0.03) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 -0.446*** -1.025* -4.143 -39.553 -18.738* -14.110 -12.982 -13.476* 0.039 -0.123 -2.727* -0.399* -0.942* -0.341** 
 (0.10) (0.61) (57.67) (51.49) (60.52) (10.70) (11.16) (10.85) (1.50) (1.39) (6.63) (0.22) (1.53) (0.21) 
Non-interest expense 
ratio%t-1 0.012 -0.073 0.362 0.283 0.366 0.160 0.113 0.116 2.651* -2.223 2.922 1.071*** 0.434 -4.945 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.35) (0.31) (0.36) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (1.59) (1.36) (8.65) (0.40) (0.44) (5.39) 
Non-performing loans 
ratio%t-1 0.762** 0.13*** 0.005 -0.187 0.078 -0.030 -0.061 -0.042 -1.228 -1.035 2.180 2.588 -36.289 -0.673 
 (0.49) (0.04) (0.79) (0.91) (0.71) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.94) (0.84) (8.03) (1.89) (46.85) (1.60) 
Local-market powert-1 0.026 0.035 0.598*** 0.383* 0.596*** 0.443*** 0.462*** 0.445*** -0.020 0.204*** -0.012 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.723*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.73) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (1.10) 
Bank holding company 
dummyt-1 -0.003** -0.035* 0.066 0.054 0.051 -0.145*** -0.159*** -0.150*** -0.001*** -0.213*** -0.011 -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.098*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.48) (0.03) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01) 
Metropolitan statistical 
area dummyt-1 -0.012 -0.009 -0.017 -0.024 -0.030 -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.004 -0.077 -0.008 -0.024*** 0.023 -0.021*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Constant 0.404*** 1.71*** 3.182*** 3.997*** 2.591*** 0.669 1.592** 1.080* 1.505*** 1.398*** 1.228*** 0.678*** 1.856* 0.745*** 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.80) (1.03) (0.72) (0.64) (0.71) (0.58) (0.17) (0.19) (3.84) (0.05) (1.12) (0.06) 
Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.430*** -0.084** -0.348*** -0.541*** -0.246** -0.155**         
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10)         
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,638 39,620 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2185 0.2781 0.4374  0.3029  0.4444 0.3294  0.3712  0.3544 0.2719 0.3932 0.4754 0.4648 0.3022 0.4819 
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Table 4: The Impact of Securitization on Bank Z-scores, WLS with Propensity-Score 
Weighting  
Table 4 reports the results of the impact of securitization ratios on bank's Z-scores using a propensity score 
matching based weighted-least-squares estimator. We use a full sample and a 1:1 matched subsample 
including securitizers and non-securitizers with a propensity score distance within 1%. Within each sample, 
we use the propensity scores as the weights to conduct a least squares estimation. The sample period is from 
2002 to 2012. We also divide the sample period into pre- and post-crisis subsamples. All variable definitions 
are presented in Appendix A. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, 
liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding 
company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full sample 1:1 matched sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.172*** 0.220*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Total retained interest ratio%t 0.238*** 0.126*** 0.307*** 0.163*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Bank sizet -0.033*** -0.016*** -0.046*** -0.030*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diversification ratio%t 0.036*** 0.112* -0.014 0.085*** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t -0.400 8.398 -0.651 0.969 
 (0.54) (8.73) (0.61) (1.38) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t -0.600*** -0.394*** -0.675*** -0.562*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -0.150*** -0.047*** 6.109*** 0.111*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.87) (0.01) 
Local-market powert 0.073*** 0.292*** 0.103*** 0.024 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.116*** -0.159*** -0.125*** -0.105*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt -0.020*** -0.070*** -0.006* -0.027*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.766*** 0.225*** 0.913*** 0.725*** 
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 77,598 6,264 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2658 0.1726 0.2046 0.2429 
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Table 5: The Impact of Securitization on the Likelihood of Bank Failure  
Table 5 shows the results on the impact of bank loan securitization on the likelihood of bank failure. We employ both survival analysis (column (1) to (3)) and logit model (column (4) to (6)). 
The sample period is from 2002 to 2012. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, 
local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. We also divide the sample period 
into before- and after-2007 to explore the difference referring to the 2007-09 financial crisis. We control for bank fixed effects in both regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank Failure 
  Cox model  Logit model 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  full sample before 2007 after 2007  full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.561*** 1.019*** 0.335**  0.0039*** 0.0064*** 0.0016** 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.32)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
Total retained interest ratio%t -0.370 -48.354*** -0.161  -0.1270 -0.0740*** -0.1162 
 (0.93) (13.43) (0.86)  (0.076) (0.027) (0.075) 
Bank sizet 0.108*** -0.038 0.148***  0.0015*** 0.0005 0.0020*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.806** -1.363 -0.885**  -0.0077*** -0.0022 -0.0101** 
 (0.40) (1.23) (0.42)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 8.273** 16.555*** 9.020  0.1078* 0.0579** 0.1304 
 (3.81) (5.02) (9.65)  (0.060) (0.026) (0.118) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 1.185*** 1.367*** 0.951***  0.0075*** 0.0018*** 0.0108** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.30)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -29.130** 1.935 -35.379**  -0.1815 -0.2605 -0.3410* 
 (14.25) (4.21) (17.46)  (0.110) (0.589) (0.184) 
Local-market powert 0.823* 1.076 0.974**  0.0081** -0.0009 0.0124** 
 (0.46) (1.19) (0.46)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.146 -0.910*** -0.024  -0.0014* -0.0020*** -0.0004 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.12)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.826*** 0.661** 0.835***  0.0049*** 0.0009** 0.0082*** 
 (0.11) (0.29) (0.11)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant     -7.722*** -6.039*** -7.090*** 
         (0.41) (1.70) (0.46) 
Observations 77,598 37,755 39,843  77,598 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo Likelihood -3226 -3875 -2683   -5734 -5148 -5122 
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Table 6: The Impact of Securitization on the Likelihood of Failure, WLS with Propensity-
Score Weighting 
Table 6 reports the results of the impact of securitization ratios on the likelihood of bank failure using a 
propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares estimator. We use a full sample and a 1:1 matched 
subsample including securitizers and non-securitizers with a propensity score distance within 1%. Within each 
sample, we use the propensity scores as the weights to conduct a least squares estimation. The sample period 
is from 2002 to 2012. We also divide the sample period into pre- and post-crisis subsamples. All variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, 
diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market 
power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. We report marginal 
effects instead of coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank failure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full sample 1:1 matched sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.0019*** 0.0068*** 0.0015** 0.0049** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Total retained interest ratio%t -0.0070 -0.0000 -0.0086 -0.0060 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) 
Bank sizet 0.0019*** 0.0003 0.0000 0.0025*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.0107*** -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0140*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 0.0867 0.0601 0.0487 0.0968 
 (0.275) (0.961) (0.199) (0.463) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 0.0530*** 0.0012 0.0464*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -0.0449 -0.0129 -0.0421 -0.0553 
 (0.038) (0.020) (0.093) (0.048) 
Local-market powert 0.0128*** 0.0045 -0.0022 0.0194*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0023*** -0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.0048*** 0.0020 0.0011* 0.0082*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.0178*** -0.0022 0.0018 -0.0236*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
Observations 77,598 6,264 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2031 0.1121 0.2071 0.2032 
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Table 7: The Impact of Mortgage and Non-Mortgage Securitization on Z-score and the Likelihood of Bank Failure 
Table 7 presents regression results on the impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on bank Z-scores and the likelihood of failure. We use OLS in Z-score regressions (results on Heckman models are reported in Appendix 
D), and the Cox model in survival analysis. The sample period is 2002-2012. We also divide sample into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences referring to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Control variables include 
retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All 
independent variables are lagged in OLS regressions. We control for bank and year fixed effects in OLS regression, and only bank fixed effects in Cox model. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Z-score   Bank failure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007  
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
  OLS   Cox model 
Mortgage securitization ratio%t-1 0.109 -0.045 -0.206     Mortgage securitization ratio%t 0.711*** 0.974*** 0.570*    
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.20)      (0.21) (0.15) (0.32)    
Mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1 0.008 0.034 0.243***     Mortgage retained interest ratio%t 0.286 30.616 0.379    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)      (1.14) (10.345) (1.13)    
Non-mortgage securitization ratio%t-1  0.247*** 0.310*** 0.198*** Non-mortgage securitization ratio%t    0.185** 0.223** 0.119** 
    (0.15) (0.91) (0.04)     (0.52) (0.50) (0.45) 
Non-mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1  0.007 0.007 -0.008 Non-mortgage retained interest ratio%t    -1.503 -43.99*** -0.981 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)     (1.77) (12.27) (1.18) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.08*** -0.007 -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.007 -0.15*** Bank sizet 0.109*** -0.035 0.148*** 0.108*** -0.039 0.148*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.163*** 0.180** 0.107 0.145*** 0.066 0.284** Diversification ratio%t -0.813** -1.428 -0.887** -0.806** -1.371 -0.886** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13)  (0.40) (1.21) (0.42) (0.40) (1.23) (0.42) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.469** -0.45*** 8.222 -0.472** -0.44*** 5.414 Bank liquidity ratio%t 8.155** 6.437** 8.974 8.321** 15.687*** 8.886 
 (0.20) (0.10) (53.37) (0.20) (0.10) (58.03)  (3.85) (2.92) (9.64) (4.01) (4.73) (9.61) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.037 0.013 1.634*** 0.024 0.011 0.273 Non-interest expense ratio%t 1.191*** 1.377*** 0.953*** 1.181*** 1.367*** 0.949*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.25) (0.08) (0.11) (0.35)  (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.131*** 0.757 0.263 0.128*** 0.725 0.251 Non-performing loans ratio%t -28.59** 3.942 -35.25** -27.89** 3.620 -34.66** 
 (0.03) (0.48) (0.96) (0.03) (0.47) (0.80)  (14.02) (8.49) (17.36) (13.92) (3.95) (17.17) 
Local-market powert-1 0.027 0.026 0.543** 0.027 0.026 0.624*** Local-market powert 0.818* 1.246 0.973** 0.821* 1.090 0.975** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19)  (0.46) (1.07) (0.46) (0.46) (1.18) (0.46) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.04*** 0.003 0.014 -0.04*** 0.003 0.062 Bank holding company dummyt -0.152 -0.93*** -0.025 -0.143 -0.909*** -0.023 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013 -0.012 -0.024 Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.827*** 0.667** 0.834*** 0.828*** 0.661** 0.835*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) 
Constant 1.317*** 0.404*** 4.144*** 1.312*** 0.403*** 3.189***        
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.87) (0.09) (0.12) (0.82)        
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Time Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
Observations 69,258 29,638 39,620 69,258 29,638 39,620 Observations 77,598 37,755 39,843 77,598 37,755 39,843 
Adjusted-R² 0.4533 0.4781 0.4308 0.4120 0.4253 0.4187 Pseudo-R² 0.2116 0.2347 0.2112 0.2120 0.2367 0.2113 
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Table 8: The Impact of Loan Sales on Z-score and the Likelihood of Bank Failure 
Table 8 presents regression results of the impact of loan sales on bank Z-scores and the likelihood of failure. We use OLS and Heckman self-selection models in Z-score regressions, and the Cox model in survival analysis. The sample period is 
2002-2012. We also divide sample into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences referring to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Control variables include bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-
performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All independent variables are lagged in OLS and Heckman models. We control for bank and year fixed effects in OLS 
and Heckman models, and only control for bank fixed effects in Cox models. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. In Heckman regressions, we report only second-step results in Table 8 and the first-step results in Appendix C. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Z-score Bank failure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Full Sample Before 2007 After 2007 Full Sample Before 2007 After 2007 
 OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman Cox model 
Loan sale ratio% 0.240*** 0.171*** 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.192*** 0.179*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.201** 0.209*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 0.373** 0.913** 0.226** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.61) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.48) (1.36) (0.20) 
Bank size -0.079*** -0.022*** -0.016 -0.015** -0.120*** -0.022*** -0.050*** -0.038*** -0.007 -0.059*** -0.037*** -0.020** 0.109*** -0.056 0.149*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio% 0.146*** 0.032 0.026 0.026 0.299** 0.084** -0.049 -0.055 0.066 -0.043 0.086** 0.081** -0.810** -1.400 -0.891** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.40) (1.23) (0.42) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -0.469** -0.344 -0.371** -0.359 -8.018 -5.379 -0.289 -0.252 -0.439*** -0.199 -5.334 -5.508 8.164** 6.524** 8.696 
 (0.20) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (60.77) (6.64) (0.54) (0.54) (0.10) (0.53) (6.76) (6.62) (3.83) (2.89) (9.55) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 0.011 -0.215** -0.214** -0.205 0.431 -0.710*** 0.379* 0.454** 0.016 0.434** -0.687*** -0.699*** 1.190*** 1.360*** 0.957*** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.36) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 0.132*** 0.058 0.055** 0.055** 0.119 0.046 0.877* 0.936** 0.744 0.825* 0.044 0.046 -28.781** -1.652 -33.887** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.73) (0.04) (0.46) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.04) (0.04) (14.06) (8.66) (17.09) 
Local-market power 0.027 0.096** 0.090** 0.088* 0.647*** 0.066 0.139** 0.149** 0.026 0.157** 0.087 0.062 0.820* 1.178 0.961** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.46) (1.09) (0.46) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.038*** -0.120*** -0.113*** -0.110*** 0.046 -0.141*** -0.114*** -0.106*** 0.003 -0.118*** -0.173*** -0.136*** -0.152 -0.900*** -0.020 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummy -0.013 -0.019** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.033 -0.024** -0.000 -0.003 -0.012 0.003 -0.019* -0.024** 0.827*** 0.669** 0.835*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) 
Constant 1.309*** 0.780*** 0.659*** 0.623*** 2.687*** 0.819*** 1.277*** 1.044*** 0.405*** 1.463*** 1.147*** 0.762***    
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13) (0.74) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.12) (0.20) (0.24) (0.17)    
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.086*** -0.060*** -0.053**  -0.088** -0.182*** -0.139***  -0.221*** -0.164*** -0.076**    
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)    
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 69,258 29,638 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 39,620 77,598 37,755 39,843 
Adjusted-R² 0.4650 0.4506 0.4302 0.3968 0.4898 0.3548 0.3433 0.3295 0.5425 0.3606 0.3488 0.3344    
Pseudo-R²                         0.3233 0.3464 0.3229 
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Appendix A: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable     
Z-score Z-score is banks’ distance to insolvency, which equals to the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided 
by the standard deviation of asset returns. 
Bank Failure Bank failure dummy, which equals to one if the bank failed or is acquired by another bank under the government 
assistance in the sample and zero otherwise. 
Independent variables 
    
Total Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of assets securitized over total assets. 
Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Non-Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of non-mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Total Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all retained interest only strips, all other credit enhancements, 
unused commitments to provide liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or sellers) interests carried as 
securities or loans on related assets, divided by the total of all securitized assets. 
Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all retained interest only strips, all other credit enhancements, 
unused commitments to provide liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or sellers) interests carried as 
securities or loans on related assets, divided by the total of all securitized mortgage assets. 
Non-Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all retained interest only strips, all other credit enhancements, 
unused commitments to provide liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or sellers) interests carried as 
securities or loans on related assets, divided by the total of all securitized non-mortgage assets. 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Diversification Ratio Noninterest income divided by total operation income. 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets divided by total assets. 
Non-Interests Expenses Ratio Noninterest expense divided by total assets. 
Non-Performing Loans Ratio Loans past due 90 days divided by total assets. 
Local-Market Power The sum of the squares of each portfolio in every bank. 
Bank Holding Company Dummy Bank holding company dummy equals to one if the bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero 
otherwise. 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Dummy Metropolitan statistical area dummy equals to one if the bank locates in metropolitan area, and zero otherwise. 
Instruments           
Peer Liquidity Index Peer liquidity index is the average of liquidity indexes of a bank’s peers. Liquidity index is proposed by 
Loutskina (2011) to effectively capture banks’ potential ability to securitize loans. 
state-level corporate tax rate State level corporate tax rate 
Peer Liquidity Index × State-level Corporate Tax Rate The cross product of peer liquidity index and state-level corporate tax rate.  
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Appendix B: Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Z-score and controls          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1.0000            
(2) 0.0205*** 1.0000           
(3) 0.0116*** 0.1838*** 1.0000          
(4) -0.0661*** 0.0736*** 0.0954*** 1.0000         
(5) 0.0768*** 0.2032*** 0.1332*** 0.2721*** 1       
(6) 0.0617*** -0.0068 -0.0043 -0.0538*** 0.0741*** 1      
(7) 0.0101** 0.1629*** 0.0583*** -0.1337*** 0.5157*** -0.0929*** 1     
(8) -0.031** 0.0649*** 0.0410*** -0.0486*** 0.0242*** -0.0573*** 0.0702*** 1    
(9) -0.0011*** 0.0472*** 0.0641*** 0.2172*** 0.1844*** 0.0737*** -0.0169*** 0.0328*** 1   
(10) -0.0638*** -0.0408*** -0.0041 0.1920*** 0.0584*** 0.0131*** -0.1042*** -0.0180*** 0.0257*** 1  
(11) -0.0246*** 0.0235*** 0.0302*** 0.2723*** 0.0982*** -0.1124*** 0.0807*** -0.0383*** -0.0268*** -0.0337*** 1 
Note: Variables are numbered as follows: (1) Z-score, (2) Total securitization ratio; (3) Total retained interest ratio; (4) Bank size; (5) Diversification 
ratio; (6) Liquidity ratio; (7) Non-interests expense ratio; (8) Non-performing loans ratio; (9) Local-market power index; (10) BHC dummy; (11) MSA 
dummy. 
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Appendix B: Correlation Matrix (continued) 
Panel B: Failure and controls          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1.0000            
(2) 0.0068* 1.0000           
(3) 0.0002 0.1838*** 1.0000          
(4) 0.0249*** 0.0736*** 0.0954*** 1.0000         
(5) -0.0208*** 0.2032*** 0.1332*** 0.2721*** 1       
(6) -0.0427*** -0.0068 -0.0043 -0.0538*** 0.0741*** 1      
(7) 0.0687*** 0.1629*** 0.0583*** -0.1337*** 0.5157*** -0.0929*** 1     
(8) 0.0386*** 0.0649*** 0.0410*** -0.0486*** 0.0242*** -0.0573*** 0.0702*** 1    
(9) -0.0024 0.0472*** 0.0641*** 0.2172*** 0.1844*** 0.0737*** -0.0169*** 0.0328*** 1   
(10) -0.0077** -0.0408*** -0.0041 0.1920*** 0.0584*** 0.0131*** -0.1042*** -0.0180*** 0.0257*** 1  
(11) 0.0326*** 0.0235*** 0.0302*** 0.2723*** 0.0982*** -0.1124*** 0.0807*** -0.0383*** -0.0268*** -0.0337*** 1 
Note: Variables are numbered as follows: (1) Failure dummy, (2) Total securitization ratio; (3) Total retained interest ratio; (4) Bank size; (5) 
Diversification ratio; (6) Liquidity ratio; (7) Non-interests expense ratio; (8) Non-performing loans ratio; (9) Local-market power index; (10) BHC 
dummy; (11) MSA dummy. 
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Appendix C: Additional Results 
Panel A: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on securitization      
Appendix C shows the first-step results of Heckman and 2SLS regressions. Results on securitization activities using Heckman and 2SLS regressions are reported in Panel 
A and B, respectively. First-step results of Heckman regression on loan sales, mortgage, and non-mortgage securitizations are reported in Panel C, D, and E, respectively. 
Instrumental variables include: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and, 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. Bank characteristics 
include bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy 
and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Dependent Variable Securitization Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.352*** 0.331*** 0.346***  0.428*** 0.410*** 0.418***  0.275*** 0.254*** 0.696***  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) 
Diversification ratio 0.082 0.196* 0.152*  0.172* -0.039 -0.025  0.279** 0.404*** 0.011* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.01) 
Bank liquidity ratio -3.839 -3.399 -3.621  -3.431 -2.802 -2.863  -4.275 -4.023 -0.073 
 (9.70) (9.33) (9.68)  (13.18) (12.77) (13.30)  (14.41) (13.53) (0.05) 
Non-interest expense ratio 1.005*** 0.786*** 1.003***  1.136*** 0.918*** 1.137***  0.907*** 0.668*** 0.874** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.50) 
Non-performing loans ratio 3.325*** 3.533*** 3.299***  22.301*** 26.834*** 23.695***  3.528*** 3.702*** 2.579** 
 (0.71) (0.71) (0.71)  (5.06) (5.15) (5.13)  (0.74) (0.73) (1.32) 
Local-market power 0.004 0.186 0.119  0.176 0.501* 0.326  -0.229 -0.124 0.019 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.28) (0.26) (0.27)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.02) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.038 -0.025 -0.038  -0.135* -0.147** -0.136*  0.043 0.066 -0.012*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.014 -0.060* -0.021  -0.079 -0.120** -0.091  0.023 -0.013 -0.003*  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.206***    0.009***    0.004***    (0.10)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index 0.023***    0.023**    0.022***    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index 0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -6.832*** -6.521*** -6.748***  -7.883*** -5.816*** -7.705***  -7.513*** -5.576*** -5.799*** 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.23) (0.17) (0.22)  (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.3587  0.3227  0.4487   0.4514 0.3959 0.2434   0.3436 0.3902 0.2632 
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Appendix C: Additional Results (continued) 
Panel B: First-step results of 2SLS model on securitization        
Dependent Variable Securitization Ratio 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.462*** 0.484*** 0.462***  0.693*** 0.770*** 0.696***  0.331*** 0.336*** 0.332***  (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.21) (0.24) (0.21)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Diversification ratio 0.013** 0.015** 0.008*  0.019** 0.010*** 0.011*  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank liquidity ratio -0.042 -0.049* -0.043  -0.067 -0.029* -0.073  -0.008 -0.007 -0.086 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
Non-interest expense ratio 0.449 0.241** 0.447  0.869* 0.387** 0.874**  -0.086 -0.084 0.238 
 (0.32) (0.14) (0.31)  (0.50) (0.22) (0.50)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) 
Non-performing loans ratio 0.112** 0.117* 0.113**  2.520** 2.646** 2.579**  0.238 0.126 0.105** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (1.31) (1.36) (1.32)  (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) 
Local-market power 0.010 0.029 0.013  0.013 0.059 0.019  0.104* 0.107** 0.011 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***  -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.012***  0.006 -0.006 -0.010** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.002 -0.002** 0.003**  0.002*** 0.003** -0.003*  0.007** 0.002** -0.002  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.236***    0.008***    0.009**    (0.07)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index 0.171**    0.023***    0.035**    (0.16)    (0.03)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index 0.025***    -0.101***    -0.063*** 
   (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
Constant -0.097*** -0.076*** -0.091***  -0.122*** -0.077*** -0.653***  -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.107** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.24)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2900  0.2689 0.2895   0.1491 0.2720 0.2473   0.2013 0.2623 0.2718 
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Appendix C: Additional Results (continued) 
Panel C: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on loan sales       
Dependent Variable Loan Sales Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.315*** 0.281*** 0.304***  0.319*** 0.288*** 0.303***  0.278*** 0.243*** 0.271***  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio -0.183*** -0.030 -0.072  -0.185** -0.062 -0.045  -0.110 0.056 -0.021 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Bank liquidity ratio 2.913 2.815 2.913  1.511 2.541 2.610  3.827 2.797 3.119 
 (6.25) (5.95) (6.18)  (8.48) (8.41) (8.65)  (9.44) (8.62) (9.14) 
Non-interest expense ratio 0.665*** 0.387*** 0.668***  0.656*** 0.469*** 0.667***  0.583*** 0.190 0.585*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Non-performing loans ratio 3.314*** 4.036*** 3.364***  79.146*** 101.047*** 86.513***  2.372*** 2.911*** 2.375*** 
 (0.98) (1.00) (0.99)  (15.29) (16.14) (15.64)  (0.91) (0.94) (0.91) 
Local-market power -0.479*** -0.397*** -0.368***  -0.219 -0.087 -0.079  -0.762*** -0.708*** -0.674*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Bank holding company dummy 0.386*** 0.414*** 0.391***  0.253*** 0.270*** 0.259***  0.493*** 0.525*** 0.497*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.042*** -0.090*** -0.053***  -0.036 -0.077*** -0.048*  -0.029 -0.073*** -0.038**  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.007***    0.010***    0.005***    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.027***    0.026***    0.025***    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -5.670*** -5.209*** -5.515***  -5.908*** -5.364*** -5.638***  -5.139*** -4.714*** -5.036*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.3506  0.3173  0.3621    0.3306  0.3076  0.3521    0.3680  0.3449  0.3063  
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Appendix C: Additional Results (continued) 
Panel D: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on mortgage securitization      
Dependent Variable Mortgage Securitization Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.242*** 0.218*** 0.235***  0.250*** 0.234*** 0.240***  0.233*** 0.201*** 0.228***  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio% 0.026 0.172** 0.121  0.037 0.136 0.142  0.030 0.216* 0.120 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -4.037 -3.569 -3.879  -5.093 -4.167 -4.478  -3.001 -2.980 -3.287 
 (7.49) (7.17) (7.44)  (9.39) (9.28) (9.44)  (12.63) (11.50) (12.25) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 0.137 -0.126 0.144  -1.139 -1.194 -1.062  0.430* 0.168 0.436* 
 (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)  (0.85) (0.84) (0.84)  (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 1.601*** 1.865*** 1.593***  1.928 3.044* 2.128  1.634*** 1.931*** 1.603*** 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.47)  (1.60) (1.66) (1.60)  (0.51) (0.52) (0.50) 
Local-market power -0.256* -0.189 -0.156  -0.124 -0.038 -0.005  -0.373** -0.313* -0.277 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Bank holding company dummy 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.132***  0.101** 0.115** 0.105**  0.153*** 0.184*** 0.155*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy 0.115*** 0.072*** 0.108***  0.084** 0.045 0.071*  0.144*** 0.097*** 0.139***  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.005***    0.008***    0.005***    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.025***    0.020***    0.028***    (0.00)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -5.333*** -5.012*** -5.240***  -5.444*** -5.119*** -5.260***  -5.228*** -4.854*** -5.177*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.2350  0.2744  0.2612    0.2233  0.2761  0.2521    0.3226  0.3739  0.3463  
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Appendix C: Additional Results (continued) 
Panel E: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on non-mortgage securitization     
Dependent Variable Non-mortgage Securitization Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.358*** 0.346*** 0.358***  0.351*** 0.343*** 0.350***  0.346*** 0.334*** 0.348***  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio% -0.280*** -0.180* -0.257***  -0.429*** -0.369** -0.407***  -0.182 -0.054 -0.167 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -1.948 -1.743 -1.874  -3.190 -2.875 -3.120  0.929 0.215 0.786 
 (10.05) (9.81) (10.09)  (11.36) (11.33) (11.43)  (20.31) (18.97) (20.27) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 1.056*** 0.789*** 1.050***  1.173*** 0.836*** 1.156***  0.912*** 0.688*** 0.909*** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 12.222*** 12.547*** 12.128***  46.207*** 47.124*** 45.217***  9.356*** 9.579*** 9.236*** 
 (1.60) (1.61) (1.60)  (6.79) (6.73) (6.72)  (1.67) (1.69) (1.67) 
Local-market power 0.194 0.412*** 0.242  0.166 0.426* 0.204  0.200 0.401** 0.245 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.049 -0.050 -0.053  -0.119** -0.129** -0.121**  0.035 0.042 0.028 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy 0.006 0.004 0.013  -0.012 -0.003 -0.003  0.016 0.012 0.025  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.001***    0.001**    0.001***    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.026***    0.018**    0.033***    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001**    0.001** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -6.695*** -6.695*** -6.727***  -6.491*** -6.507*** -6.540***  -6.627*** -6.691*** -6.691*** 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.2855  0.2273  0.2757    0.2355  0.1949  0.2526    0.2613  0.2324  0.3063  
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Appendix D: The Impact of Mortgage and Non-Mortgage securitization on bank’s Z-scores – Heckman Self-selection Model 
Appendix D reports the second-step results of Heckman self-selection models on mortgage (Panel A) and non-mortgage securitization ratios (Panel B). We also divide our sample into before- and after-2007 periods. 
Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and 
metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. We introduce three instruments in the Heckman and 2SLS models: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 
and 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. The first-step results are reported in Appendix C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: second-step results on mortgage securitization      
Dependent Variable Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instrument 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Time period full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Mortgage securitization ratio%t-1 0.154 0.149 0.151 0.115 0.102 0.089 0.178 0.177 0.178 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1 0.088* 0.083* 0.081* 0.079 0.081 0.070 0.107* 0.101 0.100 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.051*** -0.051** -0.064*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.338*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.421*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -13.167 -12.492 -12.538 -5.110 -5.709 -5.124 -13.372 -13.381 -12.608 
 (8.16) (8.49) (8.39) (13.63) (13.40) (13.32) (10.31) (10.32) (10.54) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 -0.891** -0.924*** -0.858** 0.203 0.335 0.347 -2.572*** -2.741*** -2.564*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.058 0.025 0.035 0.612 0.308 0.429 -0.000 -0.004 -0.018 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.47) (0.62) (0.59) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.010 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.018 -0.004 -0.017 0.005 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.095*** -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.094** -0.101** -0.098** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.050*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.032 -0.042* -0.042* -0.054** -0.052* -0.059** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.550*** 2.101*** 1.983*** 1.250*** 2.201*** 2.218*** 1.503*** 1.511*** 1.812*** 
 (0.32) (0.49) (0.30) (0.44) (0.79) (0.45) (0.43) (0.57) (0.40) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.190*** -0.301*** -0.279*** -0.091 -0.282* -0.286*** -0.208** -0.208* -0.273*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2542 0.2643 0.2356 0.3343  0.3225  0.3214 0.3446  0.3645  0.3574  
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Appendix D (continued): The Impact of Mortgage and Non-Mortgage securitization on bank’s Z-scores – Heckman Self-selection Model 
Panel B: second-step results on non-mortgage securitization      
Dependent Variable Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instrument 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Time period full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Non-Mortgage securitization 
ratio%t-1 0.137*** 0.125*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Non-Mortgage retained 
interest ratio%t-1 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 0.106* 0.105 0.105 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.049* -0.055** -0.048* -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.092*** 0.010 -0.014 0.006 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 -0.470*** -0.479*** -0.474*** -0.546*** -0.551*** -0.550*** -0.451*** -0.456*** -0.450*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.427 -0.438 -0.415 -0.269 -0.274 -0.246 -9.996 -10.033 -9.910 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (12.06) (12.28) (12.10) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.476 0.550*** 0.475 0.612 0.568*** 0.577 0.558 0.577 0.559 
 (0.31) (0.17) (0.31) (0.39) (0.15) (0.39) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 -0.066 -0.066 -0.065 -0.562 -0.569 -0.545 -0.116** -0.113* -0.115** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Local-market powert-1 0.544*** 0.520*** 0.548*** 0.764*** 0.660*** 0.775*** 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.407*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.241*** -0.100** -0.107** -0.102** -0.357*** -0.355*** -0.358*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummyt-1 -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.102*** 0.015 0.010 0.017 -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 1.918*** 2.064*** 1.914*** 2.474*** 2.515*** 2.450*** 1.021 1.493** 1.101 
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.53) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.73) (0.67) (0.72) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.306*** -0.330*** -0.305*** -0.376*** -0.383*** -0.372*** -0.185* -0.257** -0.197* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2212 0.2173 0.2206 0.2965  0.3005  0.2964 0.3001  0.2964  0.3157  
 
